Arsenal, Nostalgia and the Problem with Modern Football
By Jimmy Maverick
September 29 2026
I was going to write something serious about Arsenal. I had intended to discuss the current team, tactics, recruitment, the midfield, the manager, the transfer window and whether we are finally going to win the league again.
Then I remembered that I don't really know anything about tactics.
So instead I have been thinking about Highbury.
This is probably what happens when you support a football club for long enough. Eventually the present becomes slightly less interesting than the past, largely because the past has the considerable advantage of already having happened.
I can still remember Arsenal when footballers looked vaguely like people you might actually encounter in real life. Tony Adams looked like someone who might repair your roof. Steve Bould looked like someone who might subsequently come round and tell you that you had repaired it incorrectly. Nigel Winterburn looked permanently annoyed about something.
And then there was David Rocastle.
Rocky was one of those players who made football seem wonderfully uncomplicated. Get the ball, run at somebody, make something happen. There was none of the modern discussion about progressive carries, expected assists or whatever the latest statistical invention is. You simply watched him and thought: bloody hell, he's good.
Then along came Arsène Wenger and, rather wonderfully, Arsenal became a different sort of club.
Suddenly footballers were eating properly, stretching properly and presumably being told that red wine was acceptable in moderation. Ian Wright was still Ian Wright, but now he had Dennis Bergkamp alongside him, which was a bit like discovering that your local pub had secretly employed Mozart.
Bergkamp remains one of the great reasons for supporting Arsenal.
There are footballers who are excellent and footballers who are memorable. Bergkamp was something else. He made ordinary things look faintly ridiculous. A ball would arrive at his feet and, for a second, the laws of physics seemed to become optional.
And then there was Henry.
I don't think we appreciated him enough at the time.
Well, obviously we appreciated him. We weren't idiots. But watching Henry now, in old clips, is almost strange. He was so quick, so elegant and so completely in control that he seemed to be playing a slightly different version of football from everybody else.
The 2003/04 season is particularly difficult to explain to anyone who wasn't there. Arsenal went through the entire league season unbeaten — 38 games — and eventually extended the run to 49 matches.
It sounds like something invented by Arsenal supporters after several pints.
"Yeah, but we were unbeaten for nearly fifty games."
"No you weren't."
"Yes we were."
"You definitely weren't."
"Look it up."
And then you realise they actually were.
There were also the less glamorous moments. The FA Cup final against Manchester United in 2005, for example, which was essentially two hours of football followed by Arsenal deciding that penalties would be a perfectly sensible way of dealing with the situation. Patrick Vieira eventually scored the winner and Jens Lehmann saved from Paul Scholes.
Then there was Highbury itself.
Modern stadiums are magnificent, obviously. They have restaurants, corporate boxes, enormous television screens and enough technology to launch a minor satellite.
But Highbury was different.
It felt like a football ground rather than an entertainment complex in which football happened to be taking place.
I remember the Clock End, the smell, the programmes, the noise, the fact that you could look around and somehow feel that generations of Arsenal supporters had been sitting in exactly the same place having exactly the same arguments about whether Graham had picked the right team.
And football arguments were better then.
You could say, with complete certainty, that a player was rubbish because he had misplaced two passes.
Nobody would produce a 14-page statistical analysis demonstrating that he had actually been in the 93rd percentile for progressive defensive actions.
You just said:
"He's crap."
And that was the end of the matter.
We have come a long way.
Arsenal have won 14 league titles and 14 FA Cups, and the club's history is now so extensive that you can spend an afternoon on the official website discovering that some player you've never heard of scored a decisive goal in 1937. But perhaps that's what supporting Arsenal ultimately becomes. You start off wanting to know who we're signing. Then you want to know whether we're going to win something.
Then you want to know whether the manager should be sacked.
Then, eventually, you find yourself watching a grainy video of Dennis Bergkamp scoring against Newcastle and wondering where the last twenty years went.
And that's the slightly melancholy thing about football. When you're young, you think you're watching history being made. When you're older, you realise that you were.
The 1989 goal at Anfield. Michael Thomas running through. The Double. Bergkamp. Henry. Vieira. The Invincibles. Highbury. The move to the Emirates. All those players who seemed as though they would be there forever.
They weren't.
None of us are.
Which is probably why football matters rather more than it ought to.
Anyway, I was going to write something about Arsenal's prospects for the coming season.
But I've just found a video of Bergkamp's goal against Newcastle.
So perhaps next week.
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Rinus Michels was named Coach of the Century by FIFA in 1999.
Rinus Michels: “Team Building - The Road to Success” explained Circulation Football:
#1 – This strategy is distinguished by the ability to circulate the ball from player to player until the correct moment arises for the attacking phase. It has to be linked to a healthy dose of opportunistic football via for example, the lucky pass and the cross.
#2 – It places a high demand on the build-up qualities of the team, together with high-quality positional play. This is a tough assignment, especially if the opponents pressure you constantly.
#3 – Fast combinations and excellent positional play are a must - Circulation football!
#4 – The coach who “forgets” these guidelines when playing circulation football, chooses to play boring football without many surprises, and thus easy to defend.”
ArtetaBall reverts to Crab Football when those four principles above are not followed.
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“Carlo Ancelotti Quiet Leadership” (2017) is an enlightening read.
He was AC Milan Manager (Nov 2001 to 2008) for 8 years. He bought Clarence Seedorf and Alessandro Nesta in his first transfer window and went on to win the CL Cup in the next season and Serie A winner (2003/04).
Ancelotti had the problem of fitting four great players, Pirlo, Seedorf, Rui Costa and Kaka into three places in the team. Eventually he came up with the diamond where Pirlo and Kaka exchanged places, Pirlo deeper and Kaka more forward. The 4-4-2 diamond system turned Kaka into the World Player of the Year by him playing at the top of the diamond and simultaneously, scoring more and creating more assists while allowing the team to win.
Andrea Pirlo?
Andrea Pirlo at AC Milan was a great example of how a manager can listen to a player, work with him and develop him to add value to the whole squad. Ancelotti was talking with him about how to find someone to fill a deep-lying midfield position. Pirlo simply said to Ancelotti, “I can do this.”
Ancelotti was worried that for three years he had played as an attacking midfielder and didn’t know whether he had the mentally to change his position.
Pirlo was not a physically powerful player. Instead of scaring him away on the new defensive responsibilities this role would have, Ancelotti spoke mostly about the attacking demands of the role, how he would be the focal point of the team, the game-changer.
Later, Ancelotti was able to make Pirlo feel comfortable and dispel any doubts about his capability to do it by explaining that the defensive situation was not so difficult. “I only need you to be in the right position,” Ancelotti said. “You don’t have to press, you don’t have to tackle, but you must track and be goal-side when it is necessary.” He doesn’t have to be Claudio Gentile, after all.
Ancelotti explained to Pirlo his importance in being able to organize the play of the team, how playing deeper would allow him to have more space compared to other attacking midfielders.
Pirlo was smart and recognized a potential new career path for himself, becoming one of the best deep-lying playmakers in world football and using his talents in the right role for the team. Andrea Pirlo defines “regista”.
And Arteta is still coaching Declan Rice to play like a regista, a defensive midfielder playmaking ability. In fact, Rice slows down attack with his preference to drive the ball forward, took too many touches before executing a pass, and simply lack football intelligence to understand that a 20-yard pass travels faster than he can run with the ball 20 yards up field.
Yes, Yes, I am having Nostalgia with Old Man Football in the 1970s to 00s.
Focusing on regaining possession immediately changed the way transition football was considered. Modern football is a series of four situations, flowing continuously in a circle of possession phase;
• The possession phase,
• The transition from possession to out-of-possession,
• The out-of-possession phase,
• And then the transition to possession.
• And repeat.
But now, the defensive transition was about regaining the ball quickly and returning immediately to the possession, effectively short-circuiting the way football was considered. Sometimes, you could watch Barcelona for an entire half and not witness their out-of-possession structure.
Klopp borrowed from this approach and spoke about it with a specific term: “gegenpressing”., which translate as counter-pressing. It’s sometimes misunderstood, however. Counter-pressing isn’t to press what counter-attacking is to attack. It’s not necessarily countering a press, but pressing a counter.
Guardiola Barcelona pressed quickly simply because they didn’t want to spend any time in their out-of-possession phase. “Without the ball, we are a disastrous team, a horrible team, so we need the ball”, explained Guardiola.
It was a defensive tactic, merely a proactive way of defending, so they didn’t have to defend in the traditional sense. Barcelona would recover the ball and then retain possession for long periods, organising themselves in their positional structure.
Klopp Dortmund were very different. They were perfectly solid without possession, and defending deep actually suited their counter-attacking.
But they gegenpressed because Klopp believed it was a valuable attacking tactic. “Think about the passes you have to make to get a player in a no. 10 role into a position where he can play the genius pass”, Klopp later urged. “Gegenpressing lets you win back the ball nearer to the goal. It’s only one pass away from a really good opportunity. No playmaker in the world can be as good as a good gegenpressing situation, and that’s why it’s so important”.
Barcelona and Dortmund both attempted to regain the ball quickly, but for completely different reasons.
While Guardiola’s players would press intelligently, with one man pressuring the opponent on the ball and others cutting off passing angles into opponents, Klopp’s side were less calculating and more extreme. They piled players into the immediate vicinity of the player in possession, almost crowding him out through intimidation.
While other teams were focusing on vertical compactness, Klopp was also concerned with horizontal compactness, and Dortmund frequently regained possession by boxing in teams towards the touchline.
A classic example of gegenpressing is that Dortmund goal came in a 2-1 Champions League win at Emirates Stadium in 2013. Marco Reus dribbled down the left and attempted a pass inside to Lewandowski, but he miscued straight to Mikel Arteta on the edge of his own box. Arteta passed first-time to Aaron Ramsey, and Dortmund stormed into battle. Lewandowski closed down Ramsey from the front, Reus did so from behind, while Mikhitaryan moved inside from the opposite flank to congest play, with Dortmund’s midfielders pushing forward to impose further pressure.
Ramsey suddenly found himself swarmed by three yellow-and-black shirts: Reus, Lewandowski and Mikhitaryan. Reus slid in from behind to dispossess Ramsey, while Lewandowski collected the loose ball and flicked it right to Mikhitaryan, who slammed home.
In just six seconds Dortmund managed to lose possession, regain possession and score, with their three most dangerous attackers combining on the edge of the box. Three Arsenal defenders had already started their offensive transition and began pushing up the pitch before suddenly finding themselves out of position, and Mikhitaryan’s shot was struck from precisely the position left-back Kieran Gibbs had been occupying six seconds beforehand. The left-back, having expected an Arsenal counter, found himself too wide, but Dortmund had pressed the counter, they had counter-pressed.
“The best moment to win the ball is immediately after your team just lost it”, Klopp reiterated. “The opponent is still looking for orientation where to pass the ball. He will have taken his eyes off the game to make his tackle or interception and he will have expended energy. Both make him vulnerable”.
The combination of Dortmund compression of the opposition at turnovers and their energy meant they sometime appeared to have an extra man on the pitch, and in that game at the Emirates this sense was supported by the “distance-covered” statistics. Arsenal players ran 106.3km combined, while Dortmund covered 117.8km. The difference of 11.5km was exactly the distance covered by Dortmund right-back Grobkreutz, who constantly found himself unmarked on the overlap.
Bayern Munich began to copy Dortmund. Leading the line was Mario Mandzukic, not only a powerful, physical centre-forward but also extremely hard-working, supported closely by Toni Kroos, who boasted great technical quality, was six-foot tall and powerful. They would close down the opposition defence with tremendous tenacity, backed up by Schweinsteiger and Javi Martinez.
Bayern gegenpressing was different to that of Barcelona and Dortmund, not based around passing lanes or pulling players into one specific area but more about man-marking in advanced positions.
They were a physical side, and often won possession quickly through physical confrontations and tackles rather than interceptions. The wide duo of Franck Ribery and Arjen Robben would also contribute, and just as Messi set the example for his Barca teammates, Bayern aggression was most notable when their supposedly flakey wingers got involved in tackling.
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And we have ArtetaBall that Hurzeler Brighton showed how to overcome it with gegenpressing.
What a line this is.
